With the advent of the 64bit microprocessor, the virtual address space supported by a workstation will be large enough to permit the use of a single shared address space spanning a network of workstations as the primary abstraction provided by a distributed operating system. In such a system, built upon a software distributed shared memory, the programmer has considerable flexibility when choosing a mechanism for interprocess communication. This flexibility permits the programmer to make a case-by-case choice between simplicity and performance when both goals are not simultaneously achievable. With the inclusion of mechanisms supporting protection and fault tolerance, we believe that such a system can provide the advantages of conventional message-based distributed operating systems (e.g., multiple protection domains, hidden data abstractions, simple client-server interface, and failure isolation), in addition to several other benefits (e.g., easy sharing of complex data structures between processes, transparent replication of server functions, and a uniform interface for all communication).
spaces, they are protected from malicious or faulty modification of their private data. However, a protection domain in our proposed system corresponds to a set of address ranges in the global address space. Each thread in the system maintains its own view of the global address space, using conventional virtual memory hardware to map portions of the address space into the thread's protection domain. Accesses to protected portions of the global address space would force the accessing thread to change protection domains to the domain associated with the data. Inherent in such a design is our belief that the notions of an address space and a protection domain should be decoupled in future operating systems.
Supporting a protected global address space in the operating system provides several potential benefits. When the client and the server execute within independent address spaces, neither the client nor the server can pass or return pointers to objects within their address space. Thus, all of the parameters (results) must be translated into a message and recreated at the receiving end, a potentially expensive operation when the parameters (results) involve complex data structures involving arbitrary pointer chains such as trees, DAGS, or hash tables. Since virtual addresses have the 8ame meaning in all running programs, complex data structures can be shared in our proposed system, eliminating the overhead involved in marshaling the parameters (results). Furthermore, because pointers have the same meaning on both sides of the procedure invocation, the semantics would be identical to those of conventional procedure calls, whereas an RPC has a slightly different semantic meaning than a conventional procedure call.
Another benefit of our proposed design is that by decoupling the notion of an address space from that of a protection domain, we provide the capability to iransparently replicate server functions on the client machines. In a conventional distributed operating system, the only threads that can access the private data of a server are the actual server threads. Thus, any client that wanted to perform some operation on this private data would be required to send a message to the server and wait for a server thread to perform the operation and send a response. In our model, a client machine may execute the server code directly or perform an RPC to the machine that contains the data. This mechanism is discussed in more detail in Section 2. If the server code does not perform an RPC, then the global addreas space and associated consistency mechanisms allow the client thread to directly execute the operation, which might involve data shipping to load the portions of the server data that are accessed and do not already reside on the local machine. The ability to perform both function shipping and data shipping allows our proposed system to potentially achieve improved performance over conventional systems that provide only function shipping.
Protected Global Address Spaces
Most single address space systems have relied on the programming language and compiler to provide safety.
However, we do not wish to restrict the programmer's choice of languages, and we therefore take a different approach. Decoupling the notions of a protection domain and an a d d r w space is fundamental to our proposal. The existence of a shared global address space does not mean that all parts of the global addreas space can be accessed by any thread in the system. We envision allowing portions of the address space to be protected so that access to these portions of the address space must occur via trusted routines that access this data in a controlled fashion. An outline of how this might be implemented follows.
Our proposed system supports trusted and untrusted clients, trusted and untrusted servers, and data shipping and function shipping invocations. A trusted client or server can directly access anything in the other's protection domain. A trusted client calling a trusted server incurs no overhead beyond a trivial stub executing a single branch instruction. An untrusted client (server) only has access to the parameters (results) and must perform a trap to change protection domains when tbe client-server protection boundary is crossed. The stubs for a function shipping invocation are analogous to RPC stubs. To reduce the number of messages passed on a function shipping invocation, if the server specifies that parameters are passed by reference, the referenced pages can be bundled with the call.
Binding and Invocation
When a program is loaded into the global address space, references to unresolved services are linked in. This linking is performed by sending a request to the global name server with enough information for the name server to determine the desired services, the identity of the invoking thread, and the type of machine on which the thread is executing (for heterogeneity). After authenticating the request, the name server maps service stubs (and potentially a code segment) into the program's protection domain. The name server will include linking commands that will allow all unresolved external references within this segment to be resolved once at bind time, after which the code segment can be reused very cheaply. However, function calls that occur through pointers will cause page faults and run-time linking.
At run-time, the vehicle for invocation is determined by the stub mapped by the name server into the client's protection domain. This could be implemented by laying out the server code segment as specified in Figure 1 . A pair of stub segments come at the beginning of each server segment. The first contains the stubs for operations that are performed remotely via function shipping, and the second is for operations that are performed locally via data shipping. Following the stubs is the segment that contains the actual code used to execute the operations. The server specifies which operations involve data shipping and which involve function shipping when it registers itself with the name server. This is appropriate because the server has the most semantic information about how best to efficiently access its data structures.
In the example at the top of Figure 1 , the server code and data segment are inaccessible from the untrusted client's protection domain, so the stub code must execute a trap to change protection domains to the server's before jumping to the server function. The example at the bottom of Figure 1 shows that a trusted client's protection domain incorporates the server's protection domain so that the trusted client can accesa the server data structures directly. Trusted and untrusted servers are handled analogouely, which gives the client control over whether or not the server can follow pointers within the client's address space.
Server Specification
When a program wishes to export a set of services, it registers these services with the global name server. This process is analogous to the way in which servers in an RPC system register themselves and specify the services that they support. A server can specify the protection domains (users) that are permitted trusted access to its protection domain. The run-time linkable code segments and associated relocation commands can be automated as part of the post-compilation process. Heterogeneity can be supported by installing multiple executables with the name server.
Fault Tolerance
Despite the tighter coupling between processes implied by the single address space, we believe that the same degree of fault tolerance as available in conventional client-server systems can be provided at a similar cost. At the underlying system level, each machine in the distributed system has a separate memory and all communication between machines takes place by messages. These messages may be caused either by RPCs or by the protocols used to maintain memory consistency of the global address space. By integrating the fault-tolerance support with the RPC and consistency protocol support, existing distributed system faulttolerance approaches 
Related Work
A number of single address space systems have been built over the years [l, 10,121 . Psyche is perhaps the most similar to our proposed system. However, differences exist in the cross-domain communication mechanism. Psyche uses page faults to trigger cross-domain calls rather than explicit traps by stubs. We believe that the use of stubs can reduce the cost of cross-domain communication. Another characteristic that distinguishes our system is its support for both data shipping and function shipping.
